

Studies in German Idealism

Volume 10

Otfried Höffe

# Kant's *Critique* *of Pure Reason*

*The Foundation of Modern Philosophy*



Springer

# KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

# Studies in German Idealism

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KANT'S CRITIQUE  
OF PURE REASON  
THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN  
PHILOSOPHY

by

OTFRIED HÖFFE

 Springer

Prof. Dr. Otfried Höffe  
Universität Tübingen  
LS für Philosophie  
Bursagasse 1  
72070 Tübingen  
Germany  
sekretariat.hoeffe@uni-tuebingen.de

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## METHOD OF CITATION AND ABBREVIATIONS

Kant's writings are cited from the Academy Edition (*Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, edited under the aegis of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, and subsequently the German Academy of Sciences). Roman numerals indicate the volume and Arabic numerals the page number of this edition. The pagination of the Academy Edition is reproduced in almost all modern English translations of Kant's writings.

The *Critique of Pure Reason*, identified throughout as the first *Critique*, is cited according to the pagination of the first (=A) and second (=B) editions of the work. Passages from the first *Critique* have been cited according to the English translation by Norman Kemp Smith, *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, London: Macmillan 1933<sup>2</sup>. The superscript after the date of publication here and elsewhere refers to the edition or impression of the text cited. Here Kemp Smith's translation: it first came out in 1929, but was reissued in a second impression with corrections in 1933. This is the standard version, which incorporates the A and B pagination, although certain minor changes have occasionally been made in order to clarify the interpretation of the text that is provided here.

Additions or insertions by the author are enclosed in square brackets, and titles or abbreviated titles of particular sections of the first *Critique* are capitalised and placed in inverted commas, e.g. 'Aesthetic' for 'The Transcendental Aesthetic'.

### Italicised Abbreviations of Other Cited Texts

*Anthropology* from a Pragmatic Point of View [Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht] (VII: 117–334).

*Cf.* Critique of Judgement [Kritik der Urteilskraft] (V: 165–485).

The *Conflict* of the Faculties [Der Streit der Fakultäten] (VII: 1–116).

*Conjectural Beginning* of Human History [Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte] (VIII: 107–123).

*CPrR*: Critique of Practical Reason [Kritik der praktischen Vernunft] (V: 1–164).

On a *Discovery* according to which any New Critique of Pure Reason has been rendered Superfluous by an Earlier One [Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll] (VIII: 185–252).

Metaphysical Principles of the *Doctrine of Right* [Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre] (Part One of *MS*, VI: 203–372).

Metaphysical Principles of the *Doctrine of Virtue* [Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre] (Part Two of *MS*, VI: 273–493).

*Dreams* of a Spirit-Seer [Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik] (II: 315–373).

On an *Elevated Tone* that has recently Arisen in Philosophy [Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie] (VIII: 387–406).

Lectures on Philosophical *Encyclopedia* [Vorlesungen über philosophische Enzyklopädie] (XXIX/1.1: 3–147).

On the *Form and Principles* of the Sensible and Intelligible World [De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis] (II: 385–420).

Metaphysical *Foundations* of Natural Science [Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft] (IV: 465–566).

*Groundwork* of the Metaphysics of Morals [Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten] (IV: 385–463).

*Idea* for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View [Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht] (VIII: 15–32).

*Letters*: Kant's correspondence is cited, for example, in the form 'No. 781/426', the first figure indicating the number of the relevant letter in the Academy Edition (X–XII, 1922<sup>2</sup>) and the second indicating the numbering in the collection edited by Otto Schöndörffer, *Immanuel Kant. Briefwechsel* (Meiner 1972<sup>2</sup>). The Academy numbering

is included in square brackets before each letter in the comprehensive edition of the letters in English translation: I. Kant, *Correspondence*, translated by Arnulf Zweig, CUP 1999.

*Logic*: A Handbook for Lectures [Logik: ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen, edited by G. B. Jäsche] (IX: 1–150).

*Logic Busolt* (XXIV/1.2: 497–602).

*Logic Pölitz* (XXIV/1.2: 603–686).

Lectures on Metaphysics and Rational Theology: *Metaphysics L* (XXVIII/1: 167–350); *Metaphysics Volckmann* (XXVIII/1: 351–460); *Metaphysics L<sub>2</sub>* (XXVIII/2.1: 525–610); *Metaphysics Mrongovius* (XXIX/1.2).

*MS*: Metaphysics of Morals [Metaphysik der Sitten] (VI: 203–493).

Physical *Monadology* [Monadologia physica] (I: 473–488).

Universal *Natural History* and Theory of the Heavens [Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels] (I: 215–368).

*Notes on the Progress of Metaphysics* (XX: 333–351).

The *Only Possible Basis* for a Demonstration of the Existence of God [Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes] (II: 63–163).

What is *Orientation* in Thinking? [Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?] (VIII: 131–147).

Toward *Perpetual Peace* [Zum ewigen Frieden] (VIII: 341–386).

Lectures on *Pedagogy* [Pädagogik, edited by F. Th. Rink] (IX: 437–500).

Enquiry into the Distinctness of the *Principles* of Natural Theology and Morality [Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral] (II: 273–302).

What is the Real *Progress* that Metaphysics has made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff [Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?] (XX: 253–332).

*Prolegomena*: Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that shall be able to Present itself as a Science [Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können] (IV: 252–384).

On the Various *Races* of Mankind [Von den verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen] (II: 427–444).

*Refl.*: Reflexions [Reflexionen] (XIV ff.).

*Religion* within the Limits of Reason Alone [Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft] (VI: 1–202).

*Remarks* on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime [Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen] (XX: 1–192).

*Report* on Lectures for the Winter Semester of 1765–66 (II: 303–314).

On the Use of *Teleological Principles* in Philosophy [Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie] (VIII: 157–184).

*Thoughts* on the True Estimation of Living Forces [Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte] (I: 1–182).

Metaphysical Principles of the *Doctrine of Virtue* [Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre] (Part Two of MS: VI: 273–493).

An Answer to the Question: *What is Enlightenment?* [Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?] (VIII: 33–42).

## FOREWORD

If there is *one* book amongst the fundamental works of modern philosophy which can be singled out as ‘the’ founding text of that tradition, it is Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, once described by Schopenhauer as ‘the most important book that has ever been written in Europe’. This work effected a revolution in almost every area of philosophy and lent the landscape of western thought its distinctively modern appearance. Not a few of Kant’s insights even anticipated some of the supposed innovations of twentieth century thought, such as the fundamental criticism of the ‘picture theory’ of language and reality, or the claim that our objective knowledge of the world is rule-governed in character. Unfortunately, it must be said that other aspects of Kant’s specifically modern innovations have also been ‘forgotten’ in current philosophical controversies. Thus contemporary epistemology still reveals forms of pre-critical empiricism, while debates surrounding the relation of mind and body still struggle with Cartesian dualism, even though both positions were already decisively overcome by Kant.

From its inception philosophy has enquired into the nature of knowledge, into the object of knowledge, the objective fact of the matter, and into the sum of objective states of affairs that make up our common global world. In recent times, however, the role and competence of philosophy has been placed in doubt both from without and within. From without, the questions of philosophy have been increasingly addressed by the empirical sciences, in particular by the cognitive sciences. And even when such sciences have still permitted the philosopher a certain right to practice, as it were, this right was contested from within, by philosophy itself, either in the form of the naturalisation of epistemology, or as a kind of dramatically staged ‘farewell’ to reason. In this context, Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* emphatically reveals its relevance and significance yet again. For the *Critique* can meet the challenge of this double assault on philosophy, without in any way denying the exceptional value and importance of the individual sciences. At

the same time, his *Critique* bestows an epochal cast upon the 'eternal' problem of philosophy, joining the question of how far the world of knowledge can reach with the further question of what lies beyond that world: namely that of morality.

In order to disclose the full significance of Kant's philosophy, we must of course look upon the *Critique* through a double optic, as it were, or with two pairs of eyes, the 'innocent eyes' of Kant's own time, and the 'knowing and more instructed eyes' of today. In order to appreciate the riches of this philosophy, and to counter the misunderstandings and misinterpretations to which it has been subject, we shall investigate the work in an immanent fashion, occasionally supplemented with a broader historical and comparative perspective which will also allow us to delineate the character of Kant's argument more precisely. In this connection, we shall draw comparisons not only with the philosophy of the early modern period, but also, like Kant himself in the chapter of the *Critique* entitled 'The History of Pure Reason', with the philosophy of antiquity which proved so decisive for the evolution of western philosophy itself. In order to concentrate upon the full philosophical potential of the work we shall mention only a few of the controversies to be encountered in the vast body of secondary literature on Kant (for a useful overview of the field of Kant studies since 1945 cf. Natterer 2003). In general, however, we shall address substantive issues that will help us to examine the validity of Kant's claims in the first *Critique* in constant dialogue with contemporary problems and positions, an approach which will also allow us to ask whether the philosophy of the present can still learn much from Kant.

It is obvious that we have eschewed what could be called the 'principle of malevolence', namely the tendency to seek out and emphasise problematic passages, subjecting them to eccentric interpretations, deriving strange conclusions from them, and ignoring all hermeneutic reservations or objections by the claim that one is concerned with Immanuel X rather than Immanuel Kant. As if it were too difficult to confess that we stand on the shoulders of giants, we prefer to diminish our predecessors as homunculi in order that we may appear as giants ourselves. It is surely more fair-minded, and certainly more intellectually challenging, to resist the tendency to misuse the text in the interests of some vain and supposed superiority on our own part. An attentive reading of the first *Critique* can only confirm Kant's own warning against rushing to identify 'apparent contradictions' in the work,



when in fact these can ‘easily be resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the whole’ (B xliv).

The following study can be read as a systematically presented commentary on the first *Critique*. We begin by presenting four fundamental reasons for engaging seriously with this work as the key text for modern philosophy (Chapter 1). In Part One we challenge the reductive and misleading interpretations to which the work has so often been subjected, and through a close reading of the motto from Bacon, the two Prefaces and the ‘Introduction’, we present the general outline of Kant’s full critical programme, one which represents a serious alternative with respect to many significant trends of contemporary philosophy. We then proceed, following the order of the text, to investigate the ‘Aesthetic’ (Part Two), the ‘Deduction’ and the chapter on the ‘Schematism’ from the ‘Analytic’ (Part Three), the discussion of the ‘Principles’ from the ‘Analytic’ (Part Four), the ‘Dialectic’ (Part Five), and the ‘Doctrine of Method’ (Part Six, Chapters 21–22). In this context we undertake to defend and strengthen Kant’s fundamental claims against many over-hasty and inappropriate objections. In each case we begin with an introductory discussion, followed by a commentary and interpretation of the relevant section of Kant’s text, and conclude with a critical evaluation of the argument that also engages with recent and contemporary debates and controversies. Finally, after an examination of the metaphors which Kant characteristically deploys (Chapter 23), we draw upon the ‘Assessments’ included in the earlier parts of our analysis and attempt a final overview and evaluation of the entire argument (Chapter 24). We here subject the first *Critique* to a cautious ‘dietetic’ regime, but without thereby reducing the body of the work to a quivering skeletal remnant of its original form. Since there are still so many powerful reasons for engaging with Kant, we should perhaps borrow something of the pathos of Friedrich Hölderlin and apply his words concerning philosophy in general to this philosophical work in particular: ‘You must continue your study, even if you should have no more money than suffices to purchase oil and a lamp, and no more time at your disposal than the hours betwixt midnight and the cockerel-crow of dawn’ (*Briefe*: 235; Hölderlin’s letter to his brother of 13.10.1796).

The following study has arisen in the teaching context of various seminars and discussions over a number of semesters, initially in Fribourg, subsequently in Tübingen and Zürich. I should like to express

my gratitude for many stimulating contributions from the other participants on these occasions, and for the unstinting assistance of my colleagues and collaborators Dirk Brantl, Philipp Brüllmann, Roman Eisele and Michael Lindner, and especially Ina Goy and Nico Scarano.

*Tübingen, July 2003*

## CHAPTER 1

### FOUR REASONS FOR ENGAGING WITH KANT'S FIRST *CRITIQUE*

There are three principal reasons for a substantive contemporary engagement with Kant and the following study attempts to articulate the inner unity between them. The first *Critique* represents a fundamental alternative to the prevailing currents of contemporary philosophy (Chapter 1.2), and one which directly addresses two characteristic features of our own time: the process of epistemic as well as political globalisation (Chapter 1.3) and the contemporary dominance of the (natural) sciences (Chapter 1.4). But we begin with a brief consideration of the historical significance of Kant's thought as a whole (Chapter 1.1). The present work is not intended as a contribution to Kant hagiography, but it certainly aims to contest that hagiographical tendency of the present which regards the philosophical approach generally adopted during the last couple of generations, and especially that belonging to one specific tradition, as the best foundation for engaging in systematic philosophy. For in confronting the first *Critique*, we are undeniably encountering a work of 'world literature': a text that does not belong to the past, but one which still possesses fundamental relevance for the present.

#### 1.1 The Historical Significance of Kant's Philosophy

The mature work of Kant is emphatically required reading for any serious student of philosophy. No single text has exerted greater impact upon the thought of the modern epoch, itself remarkably rich in outstanding works of philosophy, than the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In spite of the contributions of Bacon, Descartes and Hobbes, of Pascal, and then of Leibniz, Locke, Hume and Rousseau, subsequently those of Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche, and finally of Frege, Russell, Husserl, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, it would be impossible to name any work

more influential for the history of modern philosophy than Kant's first *Critique*.

While the thinkers of German Idealism and the later neo-Kantians oriented their thought in relation to this work, this is equally true for a critic of idealism like Arthur Schopenhauer and a critic of neo-Kantianism like Martin Heidegger. And we must say the same for Gottlob Frege and his contribution to logic and the theory of mathematics, which itself shaped the entire tradition of analytical philosophy, for Fritz Mauthner and his critical reflections on language, which influenced Ludwig Wittgenstein himself, for Karl Popper and the members of the Vienna Circle. For the thought of Theodor W. Adorno the Kantian critique of reason is hardly less significant than the Hegelian dialectic (Adorno 1959). Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism, had already described the first *Critique* as his 'mother's milk' as far as philosophy is concerned (cf. Fisch 1964: 15). And Hilary Putnam has claimed that 'almost all the problems of philosophy attain the form in which they are of real interest only with the work of Kant (Putnam 1992: 3). Whether we consider Kant's idea of a self-administered critique of reason, the turn to the 'subject', the concept of the synthetic a priori, the theory of space and time, the transcendental conception of the 'I think', mathematics as the language of natural science, the refutation of all the traditional proofs for the existence of God, or the basic features of a purely autonomous conception of morality, it is quite clear that to study the first *Critique* is nothing less than to explore the fundamental roots of all subsequent philosophy.

And there is a further dimension to the historical significance of Kant which must be acknowledged here. From the broader cultural point of view Kant belongs to the 'Age of Enlightenment' which has subsequently been accused of failing to subject itself to full critical examination. But since the Enlightenment arguably first becomes truly self-reflexive and self-critical with the first *Critique* itself, we may well feel justified in criticising all of the particular substantive claims of the period in question, while recognising that there is no longer any serious alternative to the fundamental attitude exemplified by the concept of Enlightenment: the resolve to think in an independent manner, to distance oneself from purely personal and particular interests, to acknowledge the claims of universal human reason. The now often repeated remark that philosophy is not permitted to assume a 'God's

eye' view of the world might perhaps represent a salutary warning to the thinkers of German Idealism, enjoining modesty in such matters, but it is entirely otiose as far as Kant is concerned insofar as he had long encouraged philosophy, even prior to the first *Critique*, to adopt a more modest conception of its own powers. By means of his careful and methodical reflections on the problem of knowledge Kant challenged the exaggerated claims of philosophy and the sciences alike and thus already suggested a radical critique of ideology which exposes the mere 'semblance of science' (*Report*, II: 311) and the 'delusion of knowledge' (*Letters*: Nr. 34/21).

The earlier followers and critics of Kant, like Reinhold and Fichte, and subsequently Hegel as well, effectively demoted the first *Critique* to a kind of propaedeutic for the systems which they then explicitly undertook to construct. Although Kant himself once described the first *Critique* as a kind of 'propaedeutic (preparation)' (B 869; cf. B 25 and B 878), he directly contested 'the presumption of claiming that I have intended simply to provide a *propaedeutic* to transcendental philosophy rather than the *system* of this philosophy itself' (*Notice concerning Fichte's 'Science of Knowledge'*, XII: 370f.). For as distinct from the genuine propaedeutic of 'logic', which forms 'only the vestibule of the sciences' (B ix), the first *Critique* belongs to pure philosophy and investigates the true subject matter of such philosophy – namely 'true and merely apparent knowledge' – in a thorough and systematic manner. The first *Critique* thus already outlines 'the complete plan' of the system of pure reason 'on the basis of principles' and 'guarantees the completeness and certainty of the structure in all its parts' (B 27). It is only in a subordinate sense that the first *Critique* can be described as lacking in completeness, as for example in the presentation of the pure concepts of the understanding, which introduces all of the relevant basic concepts, or categories, but does not specify the other pure derivative concepts of the understanding, Kant's so-called 'predicables' (B 107f.), which would also have to be presented in due course. Thus although the first *Critique* only provides us with 'prolegomena for any future metaphysics', it nonetheless contains the extensively developed form of what we may call Kant's 'fundamental philosophy'.

Until fairly recent times our own epoch has generally been described as that of 'modernity'. This term was understood to capture the emphatic rise of natural science, technology and medicine, the

concomitant disenchantment of nature, and the progressive emancipation of the subject from the fetters of history and tradition. It has also served to characterise specific phenomena of alienation and reification, the far-reaching transformations that have taken place in the fields of art, literature and music, and, last but not least, the development of the democratic constitutional state. In some respects this standard self-conception of modernity now shows certain signs of breaking down. The emergence of a 'post-modern' conception of thought and experience has raised emphatic doubts about the validity of allegedly universal knowledge transcending the particularity of different cultures, and this development has only furnished a further reason for a serious engagement with the first *Critique*. The present work discusses and addresses what I have called 'epistemic modernity' not in terms of its own secondary expressions and manifestations, but explicitly in relation to its most sophisticated and intrinsically self-critical form. I am thereby also attempting to develop my own earlier reflections concerning the 'project of modernity'. After having addressed questions of right, politics and the state (Höffe 2002 and 2007), and ethical issues arising from the relationship between science, technology and the environment (Höffe 2000<sup>4</sup>), I turn in the present work directly to the theory of philosophy and science itself.

## 1.2 An Alternative Form of Fundamental Philosophy

If the principal reason for attending to Kant's first *Critique* were merely its enormous historical importance, one could of course simply reduce it to a mighty monument of the past. Its governing conception of the synthetic a priori is now widely regarded as highly questionable, and the idea of transcendently grounded natural laws, the constructive culmination of the work, is hardly given any serious consideration at all. Certain critics of Kant lament the fact that he failed to participate in the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy, some charge the first *Critique* with a kind of epistemological solipsism, while others ascribe a merely marginal role to his thought in relation to the currently prevailing philosophy of mind.

We already find Herder criticising and attempting to overcome Kant's general programme, in the wake of Johann Georg Hamann, by explicit recourse to the philosophy of language. Hamann had roundly

asserted 'the genealogical priority of language' and claimed that language itself represents the 'centre point of reason's misunderstanding with itself' (Hamann, *Metakritik*: 286; Haynes translation: 211), thereby anticipating, albeit in a less sophisticated form, two key aspects of the subsequent linguistic turn: the idea that the philosophy of language is itself the fundamental philosophical discipline and interest in philosophy as an essentially therapeutic clarification of the snares of language. Herder likewise declared the 'philosophy of human language' to be the 'ultimate and highest philosophy' and ascribed many of the follies and contradictions of reason to the 'inadequately employed instrument of language' upon which it depends (Herder, *Werke* VIII: 19f.).

Over a hundred years later we find Fritz Mauthner claiming that 'philosophy is the theory of knowledge, the theory of knowledge involves the critique of language, but the critique of language leads to the liberating thought that human beings, with the words available to their languages, ... never get beyond a pictorial representation of the world' (Mauthner, *Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, 1910–11: xi). This sceptical perspective, albeit without the pictorial theory, has developed, through Wittgenstein's philosophy of language games, into a widely influential current of contemporary thought. For this reason, as well as on account of the very different contributions to the philosophical analysis of language that have been made by G. E. Moore, Frege, Russell and Whitehead, and not least by Heidegger in the later phase of his thought (cf. Heidegger 1959), it has become a dogma that all philosophy *prior* to the linguistic turn, rather like European society before the French Revolution, is now revealed as profoundly obsolete.

The following examination of the first *Critique* attempts to determine whether this philosophy has inevitably forfeited its essential value now we have recognised the indispensability of language or the intersubjective character of knowledge, or whether, since the work is essentially concerned with other questions, it should properly be located 'alongside' rather than simply 'prior' to the philosophy of language. At any rate we shall here investigate the first *Critique* with a view to the possibility of developing a 'fundamental philosophy' which is framed neither in terms of the linguistic turn nor in terms of a more general discourse theory. In addition it is also noticeable that analytical philosophy itself has now turned away from its earlier almost

exclusive preoccupation with language as the central philosophical issue to concentrate its increasing attention upon the philosophy of mind, supplemented with contributions to ontology and to the theory of knowledge.

The history of Kant's own intellectual development itself already suggests an alternative conception of the task of philosophy beyond that of linguistic analysis. Kant himself once entertained the idea, like the advocates of a purely 'ideal language', of taking mathematics as his methodological paradigm and his *Physical Monadology* of 1756 furnished 'an example for the use of metaphysics insofar as it is intrinsically connected with geometry'. But Kant's essay on *The Introduction of Negative Quantities into Philosophy* of 1763 subsequently repudiates any imitation of mathematical method in philosophy precisely because the advantages expected of this approach have failed to prove themselves in practice (II: 289). In place of this methodology Kant now pursues a different path, oriented to the conceptual analysis of language, and argues that 'metaphysics must proceed entirely analytically insofar as its task is actually to clarify confused claims to knowledge' (*Principles*, II: 289). But although Kant was thus motivated, in the pre-critical period of his thought, by similar concerns to those of analytical philosophy, he later found himself forced, with the development of the first *Critique*, towards a quite different and alternative programme of philosophical method. (For a brief outline of Kant's pre-critical writings cf. Gerhardt 2002, Chapter 1).

### 1.3 Epistemic Cosmopolitanism

Kant's alternative approach promises significantly greater success precisely by virtue of its rich and differentiated character. And there is certainly no fundamental work of modern philosophy which exhibits a level of complexity that is comparable to Kant's text. The first *Critique* effectively represents, in the first instance, a 'metaphysics of metaphysics' as Kant himself puts it (*Letters*: Nr. 166/97), a second level metaphysics that reflects explicitly upon the possibility of metaphysics or fundamental philosophy in the usual sense. It is here that the full force of Kant's self-critical reflection makes itself emphatically felt: he interrogates the traditional claim of philosophy to represent a truly fundamental and universal systematic science and, in the course of his